Zambia’s new State-Owned Enterprises Act attempts something difficult: allowing public enterprises to pursue commercial discipline while recognising that some exist to provide services the market will not.
15th May 2026 | Corporate Governance & Publoc Policy
A state-owned enterprise may be expected to earn profits, maintain essential services, create jobs and fulfil public policy objectives—sometimes simultaneously. When those objectives conflict, responsibility can become difficult to locate.
The State-Owned Enterprises Act No. 10 of 2026 commenced on 15th May 2026. It introduces a framework for ownership, corporate governance, disclosure and public-interest service obligations, moving the discussion beyond whether Government should simply “run companies like businesses”.
Independence is built into the board
Section 15 requires an odd-numbered board of not more than eleven directors, with a majority of independent non-executive directors; the chairperson and vice-chairperson are drawn from the independent directors. These rules address a familiar governance concern: how to ensure that management decisions are subjected to independent scrutiny.
The Act also operates alongside the Companies Act, 2017. Directors cannot treat public ownership as a general exemption from duties of care, risk management, judgment and proper authorisation.
What if the public interest requires an unprofitable service?
This is where the legislation becomes particularly instructive. Section 32 provides for the authorisation of public-interest service obligations, including Cabinet approval, a written agreement identifying costs and compensation terms, publication and submission to the National Assembly.
Rather than permitting vague instructions to perform non-commercial tasks without identifying who pays, the framework seeks to make these obligations explicit and accountable. The accounting distinction between a commercial loss and the cost of a properly authorised public service is consequential.
A level playing field?
Section 34 addresses competitive neutrality and prohibits undue advantage between state-owned and private-sector enterprises, subject to the Act’s exceptions. Section 25 requires specified financial and governance information to be published. Those provisions matter to private competitors, lenders and taxpayers who need to understand the extent of State support.
The central challenge is not whether a public enterprise should be public or commercial. It is whether Government, directors and citizens can identify which objective the company is pursuing—and who is accountable when it fails.
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